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Abstract
Certainty around the regulatory environment is crucial to enable responsible AI
innovation and foster the social acceptance of these powerful new technologies. One no-
table source of uncertainty is, however, that the existing legal liability system is inapt
to assign responsibility where a potentially harmful conduct and/or the harm itself are
unforeseeable, yet some instantiations of AI and/or the harms they may trigger are not
foreseeable in the legal sense. The unpredictability of how courts would handle such
cases makes the risks involved in the investment and use of AI incalculable, creating an
environment that is not conducive to innovation and may deprive society of some bene-
fits AI could provide. To tackle this problem, we propose to draw insights from financial
regulatory best-practices and establish a system of AI guarantee schemes. We envis-
age the system to form part of the broader market-structuring regulatory frameworks,
with the primary function to provide a readily available, clear, and transparent funding
mechanism to compensate claims that are either extremely hard or impossible to real-
ize via conventional litigation. We propose it to be at least partially industry-funded,
with funding arrangements depending on whether it would pursue other potential pol-
icy goals. We aim to engage in a high-level, comparative conceptual debate around the
suitability of the foreseeability concept to limit legal liability rather than confronting the
intricacies of the case law of specific jurisdictions. Recognizing the importance of the
latter task, we leave this to further research in support of the legal system’s incremental
adaptation to the novel challenges of present and future AI technologies.
1 Introduction
With proliferating AI-human interactions, issues around the civil and criminal liability of AI
have moved to the forefront of legal policy debates. Can a bank using an AI-enabled lending
decision-making system that unexpectedly turns out to unlawfully discriminate customers
successfully sue the provider of the system? Who is liable if an autonomous vehicle (AV) hits
a pedestrian or is involved in a crash? What happens if an AI engages in criminal actions
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owing to, say, an unexpected value alignment problem of the sort described in Schreier’s
Robot and Frank or the canonical paperclip maximizer doomsday scenario?
While each of these questions touches upon different domains of legal liability—contrac-
tual, tort, and criminal liability, respectively—their core inquiry is the same: Who should
be held accountable if something goes wrong with an AI and based on what rules? Well
aware that courts and policymakers will soon have to come up with satisfactory answers,
a growing number of papers has taken a first crack at examining the topic from various
perspectives. The result is a landscape of conflicting accounts on how best to go about AI
liability and the legal system’s overall ability to adapt to this latest wave of technological
innovation.
Some further the debate by synthesizing the relevant literature, see Kingston [21] on
selected aspects of civil and criminal liability. Among those having faith in the existing
system’s adequacy to deal with AI liability issues is Hubbard [16], who—tacitly invoking
the famous Hand Formula [18]—concludes that the current US system of contractual and
tort liability strikes a fair and efficient balance between ensuring safety and incentivizing
innovation. Consequently, he sees no reason to apply different metrics to compensating
physical injury inflicted by sophisticated robots (defined as having some degree of connec-
tivity, autonomy, and potentially machine-learning (ML) ability).
Given the apparent imminence of the topic, quite a few papers revolve around AVs.
Liechtung [27] urges for timely adjustment of regulation and oversight mechanisms to pre-
pare for the impending mass-release of AVs. He also stresses the importance of clarity and
predictability of the legal liability regime—whatever liability rules are chosen—so those in-
volved in the development, production, and distribution of AVs can better assess their risk
exposure.
Several commentators argue for subjecting AVs or AI more broadly to strict liability—
commonly some type of products liability regime [13, 27]. An interesting recent idea in this
realm has been put forward by Vladeck [41], advocating a strict liability regime entirely
detached from notions of fault—in essence a court-implemented insurance system. In a
practical, goal-oriented, if slightly doctrinally inconsistent approach, he proposes to simply
infer liability from negative outcomes to overcome situations where it is impossible to es-
tablish fault. Doing so, he hopes to create a more cost-efficient, equitable, and predictable
liability regime, which provides a safe and stimulating environment for innovation, better
protection to blameless parties, and fairer cost-spreading among affected parties. As a way
of achieving the latter, he contemplates abandoning the current practice of treating AV
liability as an agency question and conferring legal personality on AVs coupled with a com-
pulsory self-insurance instead. Relatedly, Karnow [19] advocates an electronic personality
for autonomous robots (by which he means those with an ML component) to enable the
legal system to hold them directly liable under tort law.
A contrasting view reveals concerns about potentially ludicrous expenses involved with
complex products liability suits, pre-trial settlements, product recalls, and punitive dam-
ages, pressing for a meticulous application of the negligence doctrine to AV incidents [15].
He maintains that equal treatment of AVs and those under human guidance in this manner
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would also result in a higher degree of legal certainty spurring innovation—a common theme
supporting all the above views—and allow for the operation of market-based incentives such
as reputational concerns.
Finally, Karnow [20] expresses doubts as to whether any of the classic US tort doctrines—
negligence and the various forms of strict liability—is up to allocating liability for wrong-
doings of truly autonomous robots. This is because foreseeability is a central element of
each of these doctrines, however, due to complex non-linear interactions between intricate
robots and their equally convoluted, unpredictable environment, neither robots’ actions nor
the potential harms they may cause are foreseeable in the sense required by law. Regarding
AVs and autonomous robots and mostly in the context of US tort law, other commenta-
tors have voiced similar concerns about potential liability gaps and the implications of a
resulting overall uncertainty surrounding the legal liability of AI systems. They confirm
Karnow’s observation about the centrality of foreseeability in limiting legal liability but
concede that emergent behavior (i.e., behavior contingent on the interaction of a system’s
elements rather than the elements themselves) exhibited by some systems may trigger gen-
uinely unforeseeable categories of harm [3, 6]. This unpredictability of foreseeability makes
it even harder to evaluate the chances of success of litigation and hence exposure to liabil-
ity, adding to the uncertainties that flow from the inconsistency of jurisprudence during the
typically significant time lag needed for the legal system to adapt to novel technologies. The
resulting problems—known all too well in law and technology literature [32]—are inhibition
of innovation and adoption of new technologies, in extreme cases reaching as far as shutting
down entire emerging markets.
In this paper, we restrict the focus of the above sketched AI liability debate by analyzing
only the foreseeability concept’s ability to serve as a means to limit and attribute legal
liability. At the same time, however, we will also move this important discussion beyond
US tort law and embodied AI systems or particular AI applications—indeed beyond any
national analysis and law in general, for the following reasons:
AI is just one of the most recent waves of technological innovation (sometimes referred to
as the fourth industrial revolution) all of which have fundamentally impacted our societies
and economies. Due to its rapid pace of development, massively transformative nature, and
other changes—most notably globalization—our world has undergone, AI is anticipated to
affect humanity and our environment even more intensely. Recognizing this, there are major
national AI strategies and international policy initiatives underway, which aim to forge an
innovation-friendly, enabling regulatory environment, capturing benefits and minimizing
potential risks AI may bring [12, 30, 9, 1]. All these initiatives converge on the point that
successful societal adoption of AI—like any other form of technological innovation—requires
trust on the part of society. Trust, in turn, hinges on at least some level of certainty about
how AI will impact society and the economy: developers need to be able to assess the
risks inherent in bringing a new product on the market, while consumers and other users
of the technology must be assured that its use is reasonably safe. Without such trust and
certainty, there can be no market for emerging technologies, and AI would not be the first
one experiencing difficulties on this front [32]. Certainty itself flows from a safe, transparent,
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and flexible regulatory environment that supports innovation, but designing one—even just
a liability regime—is neither a purely legal nor an exclusively national enterprise.
From an economic perspective, the regulatory frameworks that structure our economies
together with market imperfections crucially determine the extent to which society benefits
from technological innovation [38]. It is established wisdom that in our reality of imperfect
markets, technological innovation is not necessarily Pareto-improving. On the contrary, in
the absence of cleverly devised and potentially substantial redistributive measures, it can
actually aggravate inequality and decrease overall welfare [23]. Stiglitz [38] also shows that
inequality-related problems can only be effectively tackled by a holistic approach involving a
complete and systematic revamp of market-structuring regulatory frameworks, which legal
liability regimes are admittedly part of.
The above cited key international AI policy documents, and—based on a review of
relevant international relations literature—Erde´lyi and Goldsmith [8] also underscore the
necessity of international coordination and cooperation in the AI domain. The core of the
arguments here is that issue areas with transnational impact—such as AI—are impossible to
effectively regulate by means of isolated national measures. This is because their inevitable
fragmentation and divergence invoke inefficiencies and tensions in international policymak-
ing, negatively affecting domestic regimes and shattering both national and international
actors’ faith in such approaches.
These arguments combined call for a holistic, multidisciplinary, and transnational per-
spective, forbidding an isolated legal or nationally focused analysis of liability regimes.
Hence, Section 2 will start with a high-level, comparative legal analysis, explaining why
foreseeability is central to attributing legal liability and highlighting a potential conceptual
problem related to its suitability to constrain the legal liability of AI systems. We argue
that foreseeability is common to all types of legal liability irrespective of the area of law
they originate from, and may raise attribution problems in relation to the actions of any
embodied or disembodied AI system, provided it uses certain types of ML models. Note
that although under the current state of technology these problems arise in connection with
certain (not all!) ML-based systems, in the future they are equally conceivable in relation
to other types of AI systems. Therefore—as outlined in Section 3 in more detail—we un-
derstand the term AI system as defined by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in the OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence [30], as this allows
for the inclusion of any present and future AI technologies that may pose similar challenges.
We use the more generic term AI in effect interchangeably, referring to a diverse set of tech-
nologies that it encompasses at any given time. Our aim is to spur further legal debate in
diverse jurisdictions. Examining the case law of multiple legal systems is, however, beyond
the scope of the paper, not least because—as Barfield [3] points out with respect to US case
law dealing with robots—cases that could serve as precedents date back to prior to the ad-
vent of ML-based instantiations of AI and consider non-autonomous systems. Consequently,
they are not directly relevant for the foreseeability problem we
Section 3 will recommend an approach to tackle current difficulties policymakers face in
trying to define AI, and also engage in a short technical analysis of the current spectrum of
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ML-based AI systems to illustrate that a subset of them does not fulfill the foreseeability
requirement.
As noted above, prolonged legal uncertainty is just as toxic to innovation as an unduly
restrictive policy stance. Hence, Section 4 will first suggest a minor amendment to the
existing legal liability regime—as emerging based on our comparative legal analysis. This
reflects our belief that—despite the appeal of such a quick-fix solution—the unaltered ap-
plication of existing liability rules to AI or a protectionistically motivated recourse to strict
liability with a view to establish responsibility at any cost are not the correct answers for
three reasons: First, ignoring that those rules have been tailored to different circumstances
and may hence be inept for AI, they contravene the delicately balanced objectives of the
legal liability system. Second, they inhibit AI innovation by adopting an unduly punitive
approach. Third, undue resort to strict liability merely circumvents foreseeability and fault
problems in a dogmatically inconsistent manner rather than remedying them.
Section 5 will then discuss our thoughts on the simultaneous creation of a system of AI
guarantee schemes (AIGSs). This would be a clear and transparent framework for speedy
compensation in cases where a liability suit has uncertain or no prospect of success owing
to the unforeseeable nature of the damaging conduct, the (type of) damage itself, or the
excessive costs and/or complexity of the procedure. Mirroring some aspects of financial
system guarantee schemes, which form an integral part of the financial safety net and
crucially contribute to maintaining trust in the financial system, the AIGSs could function
as a second line of defense beyond the ambit, yet complementing the existing system of
legal liability. Depending on the AIGSs’ designated role within the broader regulatory
frameworks structuring our economies and the policy goals they pursue, they should be in
whole or in part funded by the AI industry.
Summary of Contributions:
• Meticulous comparative legal analysis of the foreseeability concept’s role and adequacy
in constraining and attributing liability in the context of AI systems across all legal
domains.
• Multidisciplinary arguments to show the economic and political costs of failure to
solve the identified foreseeability problem in a timely and internationally coordinated
manner.
• We point out and illustrate with concrete examples that there exist AI systems that
do not fulfill the legal foreseeability requirement.
• Recommendation on how to approach definitional difficulties in AI policy and regula-
tory debates.
• Proposal to amend existing legal liability regimes to account for AI’s social utility.
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• Proposal to set up a system of AI guarantee schemes based on financial regulation best
practices to minimize legal uncertainty and foster safe and responsible AI innovation.
2 Conditions for Imposing Legal Liability
Legal liability for AI systems could originate from either criminal or civil law. Civil liability
can be further divided into contractual, tortious, and statutory liability according to the
particular field of law from which the liability emanates. Conscious of the importance of
striving for a globally consistent treatment of AI-related issues from the outset [8], we would
like to once more note our intention to take a comparative legal approach either referring
to genuinely transnational sources of law or highlighting common patterns in the law of
several jurisdictions. In so doing, we hope to provide an analysis that resonates with the
international community.
Contractual liability is premised on a contractual relationship between the parties. We
illustrate how it is construed based on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) [40]—the key international trade law convention
governing the international sale of goods. The CISG is viewed as prima facie evidence
for general contract principles reflecting widely accepted, international commercial best-
practices making up the core of a broad set of legal systems [5]. As such, it is not only
derived from and influencing national legal systems, but also crucially guides international
commercial arbitral tribunals, which will likely be heavily involved in the adjudication of
AI-related commercial disputes in the coming years.
In common law tradition, the CISG adopts a notion of strict liability for breach of con-
tract: the party failing to perform its contractual obligations is liable for non-performance
regardless of whether fault can be established on their part, see Articles 45 and 65 CISG
and [5]. However, recognizing that the party in breach cannot control all circumstances
leading to non-performance, this unbounded liability is restricted in two ways. First, only
foreseeable damages can be claimed, i.e., loss the non-performing party has or ’ought to
have’ foreseen as a possible consequence of the breach based on information they did or
’ought to have’ known when concluding the contract (Article 74 CISG). Second, liability
is excluded if the force majeure excuse (Article 79 CISG) comes into play. Under the
force majeure test—where fault becomes relevant—the non-performing party must prove
that the breach was caused by an unforeseeable, unavoidable, and insurmountable imped-
iment beyond their control. A foreseeable impediment is defined as one that parties could
’reasonably be expected to have taken [...] into account.’ The foreseeability requirement
determines the contractual risk allocation through an implicit, but rebuttable assumption
that the party in breach assumes risk for the occurrence of foreseeable circumstances. For
a good overview, see [5]. Thus, in international contract law, the concept of foreseeability
determines both the scope of damage claims and the extent to which liability for breach of
contract can be established.
Conversely to contractual liability, tortious liability can be triggered irrespective of
whether the parties have a preexisting relationship. In fact, in line with the principle
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of corrective justice, tort law links wrongdoer and victim—likely total strangers—through
the notion of liability to compensate for the harm the former wrongfully inflicted upon the
latter [31, 42]. A comparison of different legal systems yields a somewhat confusing picture
as to how liability is construed, but at the end of the day, countries reach similar solutions
to similar problems. Our attempt to outline a systematic overview is based on [24, 25].
Starting with the common traits, in most jurisdictions, tort law distinguishes between
negligence and strict liability, although the extent to which the latter is recognized varies
considerably. Negligence is a fault-based liability imposed on a tortfeasor that fails to ex-
ercise reasonable care, while strict liability is negligence’s no-fault counterpart, which is
typically linked to the existence of a particular source of danger rather than the conduct
(either action or omission) creating it [20]. Pursuant to the principle of bilateral justifi-
cation characterizing private law, a causal relationship between the tortfeasor’s conduct
and/or the thereby created risks and the victim’s harm is universally seen as a minimum
condition to shift damage to the tortfeasor and establish their legal obligation for compen-
sation [24]. Causation is given if the harm would not have occurred but for the conduct
or risks in question—this is known as the but for test or conditio-sine-qua-non formula in
the legal jargon. However, as discussed below, all legal systems deem such an unrestricted
responsibility for all damage that may ensue as a consequence of some conduct unreasonable
and employ additional value judgments to confine the scope of liability. This is where the
similarities stop and the inconsistencies start.
First, there is a disturbing amount of conceptual inconsistency across various legal sys-
tems with regard to the—often interchangeably used—terms wrongfulness, fault, culpability,
and negligence. As far as wrongfulness and fault are distinguished, wrongfulness—a term
widely used in Germanic countries—is an objective concept that refers to misconduct, i.e.,
a conduct that’s somehow incorrect in the eyes of the law, whereas fault is a subjective
notion which serves to assign blame to a certain misconduct. Systems where such a dis-
tinction does not exist follow essentially the same logic by uniting objective and subjective
considerations under the umbrella of a single term (fault in France) or resorting to addi-
tional helping mechanisms (e.g., duties of care in English and US law). English law views
fault as an element of wrongfulness, yet tends to use both concepts interchangeably. US
law makes no distinction at all and prefers the term culpability or fault over wrongfulness.
Negligence—popular especially in common law jurisdictions—either means the fault-based
class of tort liability by contrast to strict liability or is used as a synonym for fault and
culpability.
To make sense of this, it is helpful to acknowledge that all legal systems aim to protect
various rights and interests by identifying and preventing potentially harmful and hence
wrongful behaviors. There is, however, a key difference in how civil and common law
jurisdictions go about this: Following a more systematic approach, civil law countries have
chosen to codify such behaviors—which form the basis of wrongfulness—in distinct statutory
provisions. In common law systems, on the other hand, such standards of conduct have been
incrementally developed through case law by defining specific duties of care for different
types of torts. Correspondingly, to hold a defendant liable for damages caused by their
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conduct, civil law’s wrongfulness or fault inquiry focuses on whether the factual elements of
a norm have been fulfilled and—if the norm in question establishes fault-based liability—
whether the conduct should be qualified as careless under the given circumstances. Common
law approaches torts in a slightly different, yet in terms of the outcome essentially similar
manner: Responsibility for strict liability torts merely requires proof that a particular harm
occurred, that said harm was caused by the defendant’s conduct, and that the defendant
could foresee at least the type of harm that transpired, while in case of negligence torts an
additional breach of a particular duty of care by a faulty or negligent conduct is necessary.
Jurisdictions also differ in how they measure fault and negligence. The prevalent objec-
tive standard of measurement considers a conduct faulty or negligent if it lacks reasonable or
ordinary care, i.e., does not correspond to the way a reasonably prudent person would have
acted in the defendant’s position. Most strikingly in the US, the negligence standard is an
economically charged concept determined by a balancing approach—essentially an economic
cost-benefit analysis—known as the already mentioned Hand Formula [18]: A conduct is
deemed negligent if the expected harm—the magnitude of a potential loss (L) adjusted by
the probability of its occurrence (P)—outweighs the costs to avoid the harm—the burden
of undertaking precautionary measures (B). Put formally, a duty of care is generated where
P × L > B [34, 43]. Other common law jurisdictions rely on this economic logic more
covertly and often include additional factors, like the social utility of the conduct, among
the balancing criteria, in effect modifying the above formula as follows P × L > B + U ,
where U stands for social utility. This objective approach is usually justified with reference
to the exorbitantly high administrative costs of determining each defendant’s abilities on an
individual basis, the observation that the tortfeasor’s abilities have no bearing on how their
actions affect others, the endeavor to reinforce people’s moral responsibility, or that the
law needs to define average standards of conduct in pursuit of general welfare. Proponents
of a subjective approach criticize that this amounts to an imposition of strict liability in
cases where the defendant’s abilities are below average. There is little practical difference
between the two approaches, as ultimately both require courts’ discretionary judgment on
whether it is reasonable to impose liability on a case-by-case basis.
As pointed out earlier, all jurisdictions reduce the scope of liability delineated solely
through causation. Here again, approaches and terminology are confusingly inconsistent
both across jurisdictions and different points in time, but restrictions are achieved in two
basic ways: By limiting either causation or the scope of liability. The first technique works
with an unbounded notion of fault imputing liability for all damages caused by a conduct,
but treats causation as a normative rather than natural concept and employs the theory of
adequacy to exclude liability for atypical or remote damage, i.e., damage stemming from
an entirely coincidental, objectively unforeseeable interplay of circumstances, which the
tortfeasor could not have possibly controlled. The second method conceives of causality in
the natural sense of the term and—based on prediction theory—limits the scope of liability
by restricting the duty of care to foreseeable harms, i.e., those the defendant should have
actually been capable to avoid [20]. It follows that, either way, fault based liability can only
be imputed for foreseeable harms.
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Perhaps less intuitively, foreseeability is equally central to strict liability torts, despite
the fact that fault plays no role here. To understand why, consider that strict liability is
imposed on the premise that someone creates a source of danger, which is likely to cause
harm and—crucially—which said person has the ability to control. Yet control implies
that both dangerousness and potential harms are recognizable, that is, foreseeable. US
doctrines of strict liability include ultrahazardous activity and three types of products
liability. In civil law systems, a number of specific statutory provisions prescribe non-
fault based liability for keepers of, e.g., animals and motor vehicles, and other hazardous
activities. Jurisdictions with a strict-liability-averse stance, such as England, solve such
cases over negligence, but they tend to stretch duty of care requirements so far that liability
becomes virtually inevitable—yet another example of similar results achieved by seemingly
distinct approaches.
Similar arguments support the claim that foreseeability is also an essential condition for
the imposition of statutory liability: Statutes pre- or proscribe a certain conduct to prevent
some risks typically inherent in that behavior from materializing, whereas the scope of
a norm cannot reach beyond the limits of foreseeability. Instruments like the protective
purpose theory in some European legal systems or the harm-within-the-risk rule in the US
serve the purpose to limit liability for breach of statutory provisions based on this logic.
Turning to criminal liability, we now outline the basic requirements for establishing
criminal responsibility based on the comparative analyses of Anglo-American, continental,
and international criminal law provided by Fletcher and Marchuk [29, 11]. Pursuant to
the legality principle—a central moral principle of criminal law expressed by the Latin term
nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law)—criminal punishment typically presupposes
that a particular conduct is criminalized by law, i.e., penalized behavior and potential
sanctions—the severity of which reaches well beyond those imposed under civil law—are
clearly laid down in statutory provisions. Criminal law pursues primarily punitive objectives
against those engaging in statutorily criminalized socially unacceptable behavior while being
mentally capable to recognize the unlawfulness of their conduct. Committing a crime always
requires a physical element referred to as actus reus (guilty act). With the exception of strict
liability offenses, where the blameworthiness of a conduct that violates a norm protecting
certain societal values is presumed, this must be accompanied by a subjective element
referred to as mens rea (a.k.a. culpability, fault, or blameworthiness)—criminal law is also
plagued by a fair amount of terminological inconsistency. By contrast to tort liability, which
takes recourse to mostly objective standards to determine the blameworthiness of a conduct,
criminal law measures the defendant’s mental state by a predominantly subjective test.
Mens rea encompasses a range of different mental states described by a bewildering
variety of terms both within and across legal systems. The three broad categories distin-
guished are intent (dolus), recklessness, and negligence (culpa). Intent is commonly divided
into two—in certain legal systems three—subcategories: (1) Dolus directus of the first de-
gree (direct or specific intent) requires purposeful conduct, i.e., that a person commits an
offense with the desire to achieve a particular prohibited result. (2) Dolus directus of the
second degree (oblique or general intent) is given if an offender acts knowingly, that is, in-
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tends to commit a prohibited act without desiring to achieve a specific harm but foreseeing
its occurrence as virtually certain. The differentiation between these two forms of intent
is not always present: for instance Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court [17]—a central part of the body of international criminal law—requires the
cumulative presence of both volitional and cognitive components. (3) In addition, especially
continental criminal legal systems stipulate a third, more indirect notion of intent called
dolus eventualis, which focuses on the offender’s attitude towards the consequences of their
action and is satisfied if an individual remains indifferent despite foreseeing a possible harm.
Recklessness is an intermediate form of culpable state between intent and negligence
in common law jurisdictions, which penalizes behavior that grossly deviates from the stan-
dard of conduct of a reasonable person. It is given if an offender is aware of, yet consciously
disregards the substantial and unjustifiable risk that their conduct will have negative con-
sequences. It is a volitional element without an equivalent in civil law systems, although
conscious negligence (explained below) can be regarded as its closest counterpart.
Like in tort law, negligence in criminal law also connotes a behavior that departs from the
objective standard of conduct of a prudent person. Ordinarily, negligence lacks a cognitive
element—which is why English and US law are divided on whether it counts as a class
of mens rea—i.e., the offender should have been, but was not aware of the substantial and
unjustifiable risk that their action may have negative consequences. Beside this unconscious
negligence, some jurisdictions distinguish a second form of negligence dubbed conscious
negligence, given if a person foresees the risk of harm but believes—indeed almost hopes—it
will not occur. To justify the imposition of significantly weightier sanctions, criminal law
usually requires gross negligence, i.e., considerable deviation from the reasonable person
standard. It is fulfillled if an individual’s actions pose an obvious risk to bring about
substantial harm and the offender has the ability to take precautionary measures. Moreover,
negligence is typically only penalized if explicitly criminalized by law—a case in point being
Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which excludes criminal responsibility for negligent behavior
unless other provisions of the Statute expressly so provide.
Hence, with the exception of strict liability and unconscious negligence offenses, crimi-
nal responsibility likewise presupposes that the offender foresees the potential harms their
conduct may cause. In those two particular cases, however, only behaviors explicitly crim-
inalized by law entail liability, and such statutory provisions are only conceivable if the
legislator foresees that the conduct may result in harm.
In conclusion, we can observe that foreseeability (reflecting an inherent ability to con-
trol) features prominently among the conditions for imposing any type of legal liability.
Admittedly, case law in disparate jurisdictions and legal domains adds a number of con-
voluted facets to this problem, but for now we would refrain to get into those issues. The
important insight at this initial stage is to realize that we face a general legal problem,
which spans jurisdictions and legal domains, has potentially severe economic and political
implications, and consequently needs to be addressed as soon and as widely as possible. On
this note, let us now investigate if and to what extent AI is foreseeable and controllable in
the sense required by law.
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3 Foreseeability: the Missing Piece of the AI Liability Puzzle
Academic papers, policy documents, and other contributions discussing various aspects of
the regulatory treatment of AI typically either handle the concept as given and thus refrain
from defining what they mean by AI, or choose a working definition that is best suited
to their particular inquiry. While this is not surprising—after all, to date a universally
accepted AI definition does not exist—it does create problems of definitional inconsistency.
This, in turn, curtails efforts to clearly distinguish between various technologies referred
to under the common banner of AI, identify their essence and most relevant properties for
distinct policy purposes, and establish an internationally consistent policy stance towards
them.
At present, much of the energy dedicated to defining AI is directed to finding some
one-size-fits-all definition that is universally applicable in any given context. Insofar as
this fosters consistency, we applaud this intent. However, looking at things through a
teleological lens highlights that any such broad definition is only of limited use. The purpose
of defining AI one way or another is to create a concept with clearly identifiable attributes
that we can understand, allowing us to assess AI’s capabilities, anticipate its actions and
the consequences of those actions, and—ultimately—to make informed decisions on what
roles we want it to play in our societies. Yet AI is an umbrella term, which may refer to
a number of very different notions (from AI as a scientific field [33], to sub-fields of AI
like robotics and ML, to specific technologies like differing ML models), the range of which
varies over time (recall, for instance, that what we now know as big data was considered AI
a few years back). It is apparent that these concepts and/or technologies exhibit distinct
characteristics and serve very different purposes, so that they cannot be treated as a single,
homogeneous thing.
We are of the opinion that across the manifold use cases and contexts in which we
may encounter AI technologies, the technologies themselves (as determined by their state
of art at a given point in time) are the only constant elements. The capabilities of an
AI and consequently the tasks it may take on in human societies (if we so decide) are also
determined by the technology it uses. We therefore believe that any AI definition developed
for regulatory purposes should first and foremost be based on the particular technology in
question. That said, in the presence of such specific definitions, it may make sense to
additionally apply a few more generic definitions, to provide for consistency in selected
domains.
In this paper we chose to use the term AI system—which we believe is a good example
for a generic definition that promotes consistency—as defined in the OECD AI Principles to
delineate the group of AI technologies that form the subject of our inquiry. The OECD de-
fines AI system as a ’machine-based system that’ may operate at varying levels of autonomy
and ’can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations,
or decisions influencing real or virtual environments’ [30]. Here we only consider ML mod-
els, a particular class of AI systems. Expanding the taxonomy provided by Flach [10], we
distinguish four main ML models, namely geometric, probabilistic, logic-based, and neural
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networks (NNs). These four types of model classes form a sort of continuum with logic-
based models—which typically have no foreseeability issues—on one end and NNs—which
pose the biggest obstacles regarding foreseeability—on the other. Since our goal is merely
to point out that there exist AI systems that present foreseeability issues (rather than to
give an exhaustive list of AI technologies that do so) we will only concentrate on NNs to
provide such an example.
As a preliminary matter, both policymakers and society at large need to be conscious of
the fact that AI does not know, think, foresee, care, or behave in the anthropomorphic sense,
rather it applies what could be best described as machine logic. To illustrate the potential
implications of that distinction, consider the following example: ML-based systems—which
raise the biggest technical and legal challenges due to their unpredictability stemming from
their independent learning property—do not know why a given input should be associated
with a specific label (e.g., that a small, red, circular object is a ball), only that certain inputs
are correlated with that label [28]. That is, the system identifies outputs based on a set of
predefined parameters and probability thresholds through a process that is fundamentally
different from human thinking.
Conventional ML-based systems usually use human engineered feature extractors to
process raw data in order to receive a suitable representation the system can work with.
By contrast, deep learning (DL)-based systems—a neural network-based subgroup of ML
approaches—are capable of processing raw data on their own, automatically identifying the
right representation they need for classification. Furthermore, DL-based systems do not
just use this one representation, but possess a nested hierarchy of representations obtained
by transforming a lower level representation (starting with the raw data) to a higher, more
abstract level of representation [26].
What is more, this type of machine reasoning always implies a certain probability of
failure, where failures tend to occur in—from a human perspective—unexpected ways and
may have different reasons. Let us give three examples.
In the first example, the failure is caused by a bad classifier as illustrated by Ribeiro et
al. [35] in their Husky vs. Wolf experiment. Here, a system trained with 10 wolf and 10
husky pictures was given the task to distinguish between wolves and huskies. On purpose,
all wolf pictures had snow in the background but none of the husky pictures. Since snow was
a common element in the wolf pictures but was not present in the husky pictures, the system
regarded snow (or better, white patterns on the lower parts of the pictures) as a classifier
for wolves. Thus, in the experiment the system predicted huskies in pictures with snow as
wolves and vice-versa. The second example shows a way of cheating a facial recognition
system (FRS) by a physically executed attack (i.e., manipulating the physical state the
system analyzes rather than its digitized representation) introduced by Sharif et al. [37].
FRS’s are usually using neural networks in order to recognize patterns in big datasets, in this
case the differences between millions of faces (e.g., the relative position of nose and eyebrows,
size of the nose, etc.). They used a pair of glasses with a colorful frame which basically
interfered with the system’s pattern recognition. It not just blocked the view to crucial
parts of the faces but, due to the colorful frame, gave the system the impression that it sees
12
some patterns and so the FRS often made mistakes despite indicating a high probability of
confidence. Our last example shows an adversarial setting (essentially an automated attack
on a search algorithm to minimize its utility) where the adversary’s goal was to create inputs
that a DL-based system misclassifies, however, humans do not [39]. Their adversary system
manipulated input data by adding what is called noise not detectable to human eyes to the
original pictures, fooling a DL-based system into classifying a school bus and a pyramid as
an ostrich.
Even without going into technical details, the above analysis shows that it is conceivable
that AI systems and the way they generate failures are too complex or otherwise impossible
to anticipate and hence do not satisfy the legal foreseeabilty requirement. This insight sug-
gests that we have to develop new legal solutions to attribute liability to such AI systems—or
more precisely, given they lack legal personality, their designers and/or manufacturers—as
well as to distribute liability between them and their human operator(s). To tackle this
challenge, regulators and policymakers will need to dynamically determine which particular
AI technologies pose forseeability problems at any given juncture—a task that, in our view,
will involve developing and continuously adapting specific definitions tailored to each of
those technologies.
4 Adapting the Legal Liability Regime
As shown in the previous sections, holding AI systems—again, until such time that they
acquire legal personality, only the people contributing to their design and/or distribution—
liable for infringement of legal rights and the resulting damages may not be possible because
the failure causing the harm and/or the harm itself were not foreseeable. This leads to con-
siderable uncertainty, which, in turn, significantly hinders AI innovation, as well as trust in
and social acceptance of AI technologies. It is a serious problem that needs urgent solution,
unless we want to delay or even miss out on the economic and social benefits AI could bring
to humanity. Note that the extent and distribution of aggregate benefits are conditional
upon handling AI innovation the right way, especially in a welfare-enhancing rather than
economic-inequality-aggravating manner [23] and mindful of dual-use concerns [4].
Yet, any reform proposal should carefully balance the objectives a particular field of law
seeks to pursue by the imposition of liability and the overarching policy objectives guiding AI
innovation. Contract law, where liability for non-performance ultimately aims to achieve
an optimal allocation of contractual risks, is the least problematic area, as leaving the
matter of contractual risk allocation—through, e.g., negotiation of appropriate guarantee
arrangements—to the parties’ free disposition will usually yield fair results even with AI’s
unpredictability. For instance, a seller’s willingness to assume risk for an unforeseeable
failure of an AI system sold to a buyer can be offset by a higher price negotiated. That
said, the framing of policy debates on AI may influence parties’ expectations and there may
be scope for regulation to correct unjustified fears or overreactions.
As regards tort law, compensation and deterrence are widely recognized as its main pol-
icy goals. Loss-spreading, vindication of rights, denunciation of wrongdoing, and educating
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the public on the proper standards of conduct are mentioned as auxiliary objectives, while
views differ on whether private law can or should pursue public interest or have punitive
functions [24, 31, 14, 34]. Following in the footsteps of the school of economic analysis of
law, many regard civil liability as an instrument to regulate safety [34]. This opinion is
supported by the fact that tort law falls within the remit of a distinct regulatory strategy
recognized in regulatory theory labeled allocation of rights and responsibilities [2]. In this
view, negligence incentivizes safe conduct up to the economically efficient level (although
admittedly without regard to available alternative activities), while strict liability both
regulates the socially desired level of hazardous activities and encourages safety [34, 14].
An often-heard criticism in the legal community is that such objective economic efficiency
analyses are blind to equity considerations and hence not reconcilable with the nuanced
legal analysis that is necessary to ensure fair and just outcomes. However, this view seems
to ignore that the application of any such analysis requires prior policy choices on which
values to maximize and which losses to minimize in order to maximize society’s welfare.
So while the analyses as decision-making tools are admittedly value-neutral, their use is
always preceded by a set of very much value-laden and equity-driven legal and policy judg-
ments [43]. Over time, such judgments has set duties of care for particular negligence torts
and designated sources of danger to be addressed by strict liability torts reflecting a careful
and well-established balance of contradicting interests.
Resonating with Hubbard [16] on the necessity of keeping this delicate balance, we
therefore think that it is mistaken to succumb to the temptation to bypass fault or fore-
seeabilty problems by classifying all instantiations of AI as dangerous and punishing them
with the overarching imposition of strict liability. This would not only be dogmatically
incorrect, but would also strangle AI innovation and reduce social welfare compared to an
ideal, hypothetical alternative. In instances where the foreseeability requirement is satisfied
and hence duties of care can be determined, we propose to include in the Hand Formula a
further variable (U) capturing the economic and social utility derived from AI innovation
and it’s progressive adoption in society such that P × L > B + U . Considerations on the
social utility of an activity should also be included into courts’ overall balancing exercise
in jurisdictions, where a less mathematically explicit approach has been established. This
solution would require development of new methods to quantify, measure, and allocate such
gains to AI innovators, producers, and distributors instead of leaving it up to courts’ dis-
cretion. Furthermore, these gains should also be accounted for when establishing potential
strict liability standards for AI.
As for criminal liability, hardening liability standards by circumventing the foreseeability
requirement is not reconcilable with justifying the imposition of criminal sanctions.
So yes, it is certainly desirable that AI engineers have complete control over their systems
and avoid design and training failures. But is this a realistic expectation at the present
juncture? More importantly, are we willing to stall the adoption of AI until we can guarantee
its safety? Or is there a compromise that encourages both reasonable safety and innovation?
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5 AI Guarantee Schemes as Work-Around
All this leaves us with the problem that, even assuming the legal system will incrementally
adapt and solve the above highlighted foreseeability loopholes and other challenges posed
by AI, this will take time. As noted by Pearl [32] in respect of AVs and the US tort
system, we are probably looking to several decades of deliberation, trial-and-error type of
progress in the legal treatment of AI, and inconsistent jurisprudence. Yet legal certainty
is indispensable to get the most out of AI. Again, this problem is not specific to AI but
common to all new technologies, and there have been a number of other instances over the
course of history, where fears about the legal system’s ability to rise to certain challenges
have prompted a search for alternative solutions and regulatory interventions on the part
of the state.
Examples include no-fault insurance-based solutions, which substitute for and eliminate
access to the judicial system. Such accident insurance schemes are in place in several
countries in diverse fields like occupational, medical, and all types of personal injuries.
Dispensing with the need to examine how the damage occurred, these systems guarantee
victims fast compensation of their claims and involve lower administrative costs compared
to litigation. However, they have the negative effect of promoting carelessness. Moreover,
due to financial constraints, they typically only offer partial compensation through the
introduction of arbitrary restrictions conversely to the judicial system, which, provided
successful litigation, fully compensates victims. Measures to alleviate these weaknesses—
such as making the amount of compensation conditional on the specific circumstances under
which the damage occurred or granting insurers rights of recourse against tortfeasors—
help to provide a fairer and more equitable compensation, but do so at the cost of speed
and increased costs due to the necessary legal inquiry into causation. Critics of no-fault
insurance-based systems, therefore, see little practical difference to litigation and advocate
that they complement rather than substitute tort law. See Koziol [24] for more details.
Another approach, analyzed by Pearl [32], is setting up victim compensation funds—
cases in point are the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
established after the Deepwater Horizon disaster—which exist parallel to rather than in
lieu of the judicial system. Victim compensation funds have been implemented on multiple
occasions with varying objectives such as relieving pressure on courts, supporting ailing
industries, or simplifying and expediting compensation processes. As regards design ques-
tions, they may be established either as quasi-judicial or non-judicial funds. Quasi-judicial
funds are administered by the judicial system or a public agency and financed by taxes
or fines imposed on a selected group of individuals or organizations, who would assume
a defensive position in the event of litigation. Non-judicial funds are divided into three
sub-categories: Public funds, which are administered and at least partially funded by gov-
ernment or an entity with government authority, private funds, administered and funded
by private organizations, and charitable funds. The latter are also privately administered
and funded by private donations, yet they are distinct from the other three types of funds
in two respects. First, their only purpose is to minimize administrative and logistical bur-
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dens of distributing donations rather than providing an alternative to litigation. Second,
they tend to provide flat compensation awards without recourse to tort law to determine
eligibility for compensation. One notable advantage of victim compensation funds over
conventional litigation is flexibility, given that their status, funding, administration, and
processes are customarily designed with a particular set of circumstances in mind. As a
general rule, they are also a faster, more efficient, and cost-effective alternative to the tort
system. Against these advantages weigh the potentially massive administrative burdens of
establishing funds, which by far outweigh their counterparts in the judicial system. Victim
compensation funds typically also fall short of providing the degree of transparency and
publicity inherent in conventional litigation—attributes that may be of core importance to
victims.
Outlining the significant benefits involved, Pearl recommends the creation of a fund for
AV crash victims in the United States at least until the legal system catches up with AI
innovation. She proposes the establishment of a quasi-judicial fund administered by the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) and funded by taxes on
the sale of AVs to be paid by sellers and purchasers. Requiring both buyers and sellers to
contribute, she argues, is justified by the fact that both groups would benefit from the in-
troduction of AVs. She envisages a voluntary participation both for victims (requiring them
to file a claim with the fund and waive their right to litigation upon acceptance of the com-
pensation award) and AV manufacturers (under the condition of paying their share of the
AV sales tax and participating in data-sharing and design improvement programs). Finally,
the fund should only cover human injuries and fatalities, whereby compensation should be
full and automobile insurance companies (whose subrogation rights would be extinguished
where victims accept compensation awards) should be allowed to seek reimbursement from
victims’ compensation awards to recover any prior insurance payouts.
Our proposal to create a system of AIGSs is inspired by the various types of guarantee
schemes (most notably deposit guarantee, insurance guarantee, and investor compensation
schemes) used in the financial system (hereinafter FGSs.) FGSs are usually sectorally con-
figured, at least partially industry-funded, and sovereign-backed guarantee funds. Together
with a number of other arrangements—such as lender or market maker of last resort support
from central banks—they make up the heterogeneous group of financial system guarantees.
Broadly speaking, these guarantees (sometimes also referred to as financial system safety
net) are designed to provide assurance to those involved in financial transactions with fi-
nancial institutions or markets that their claims against their counterparties will be met
even in the event of a major liquidity shock or failure of the latter. Heavily expanded in
the wake and after the global financial crisis, they are a widely used and successful model
to safeguard financial stability by preserving confidence in the financial system in times of
stress [7, 36].
Even though perhaps most prominent in the context of financial markets, this pow-
erful feedback-loop between the extent of uncertainty and the level of trust is a central
determinant in shaping any market, AI being no exception. So, to foster confidence, the
idea is for the AIGSs to provide a transparent, predictable, and reliable alternative funding
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mechanism outside of the scope of the legal liability system to compensate aggrieved par-
ties. Compensation should be available in a contractual, tort, or, as appropriate, criminal
context in cases where legal liability cannot be established due to the lack of foreseeabilty
of an AI performance failure and/or the resulting harm. Furthermore, the AIGS should
also be available to shore up the legal system in the face of the anticipated uncertainty and
complexity of AI-related litigation while courts and policymakers grapple with other novel
problems arising from AI. Because such difficulties are likely to occur worldwide and in all
domains impacted by AI, our proposal is geared to the global context, taking a country- and
domain-neutral approach. Our goal is once again to spark a high-level, conceptual debate
that can inform future policy initiatives in this domain.
Governance arrangements of any guarantee scheme are strongly dependent on the broader
governance structures adopted in industries to which they are linked. Given the preliminary
stage of discussions on AI governance in virtually any domain and country, it is relatively
hard to define robust design criteria. Nevertheless, based on Davis’ [7] survey of interna-
tional practices with respect to FGSs and Pearl’s above recommendation on a US national
AV victim compensation fund, we will attempt to sketch out an initial set of principles to
guide future deliberations on this issue.
Nature of the scheme: Beyond the obvious motivation to provide predictability regarding
compensation, we see AIGSs as integral parts of the broader domestic and eventually global
AI governance frameworks, which pursue the overarching objective of ensuring that the
development and adoption of AI technologies are beneficial to humanity. One facet of that
endeavor is to incentivize AI innovators to employ responsible and safe practices, but the
funds could also be instrumental in furthering other policy objectives, such as mitigating
AI’s inequality-aggravating impacts by redistributing some of the costs and benefits of AI
innovation. In light of these strong public policy implications, quasi-judicial funds do indeed
seem best suited to function as AIGSs.
Administration: Among the ranks of academics and various public and private orga-
nizations and groupings vested with AI policy development, there is a growing consensus
about the necessity of some sort of global governance framework for AI at some point in
the future [8, 22]. However, at least at the present juncture, the reality is that AI innova-
tion and implementation is outpacing policymakers’ regulatory and oversight capabilities.
Countries are busy weaving their national AI strategies and passing the most important
pieces of legislation to have at least some semblance of control over the most pressing is-
sues across diverse policy domains—like healthcare, financial services, the criminal justice
system, or welfare—without much regard to cross-sectoral consistency. As the 2018 AI
Now Report [44] acknowledges, each of these distinct domains has its established regu-
latory frameworks, traditions, and specific difficulties, requiring specialized expertise and
sector-specific regulation. This and nascent national practices suggest that AI governance
will initially be structured in a domain-specific fashion with existing agencies taking on AI-
related regulatory functions. Given the need for speedy policy response, this is a commend-
able approach at least in the interim, until more research can be done on the optimality of
governance arrangements. In the context of FSG governance, the Davis report [7] identifies
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six key governance objectives, stressing that governance arrangements should (1) establish
clear lines of responsibility avoiding duplication of regulatory mandates, (2) eliminate av-
enues for conflicts of interests, (3) keep the administrative costs of the fund as well as (4)
compliance burdens for industry as low as possible, (5) where appropriate, involve industry
stakeholders, harnessing their expertise, and (6) provide an adequate incentive structure for
regulatory authorities.
Taken together, these observations furnish strong arguments to house AIGSs within
domain-specific agencies, at least until experience provides us with more clarity on the
vices and virtues of such an approach. In the meantime, we strongly encourage the interna-
tional community to keep up efforts towards setting up a global AI governance framework—
preferably involving some element of self-regulation to benefit from multifaceted expertise
and ensure a truly dynamic and recursive whole-of-society dialogue. Once up and running,
such cross-jurisdictional governance arrangements could justify a transnationally organized
AIGS system. Although a glance at financial regulatory experience gives reason to doubt
the practical feasibility of any sort of global plans and we realize that the prospect is in any
case a remote one, it should still not be entirely taken off the table.
Coverage: As noted by the Davis report [7], fund coverage design inevitably involves
wrestling and eventually putting up with tradeoffs between the conflicting objectives of
efficiency, equity, and minimum complexity and cost. Note that the costs of guarantee
schemes are not restricted to the amount of compensation paid out, but also include poten-
tially significant administrative and compliance costs (e.g., of the establishment, ongoing
operation of schemes, and dispute resolution mechanisms) and much less obvious indirect
costs to society in the form of moral hazard and related behavioral problems. The ap-
propriate balance between different objectives is typically sector-dependent and tools like
coverage limits, coinsurance, and means testing are among those employed to find a suitable
configuration. In widespread opinion, in view of guarantee schemes’ role as safety net (a
sort of back-up solution), they should ideally only step in to compensate substantial losses.
Given the abundance of unknown variables in this respect, we would refrain from offering
any specific recommendation at this time.
Participation: In theory, participation in guarantee schemes may be either voluntary or
compulsory. Nevertheless, few FGSs leave this matter to financial institutions’ discretion.
Instead, they typically foresee compulsory participation to avoid problems of adverse selec-
tion (i.e., disproportionate representation of the least reliable institutions in funds). This
argument also holds for AI innovators’ and manufacturers’ recourse to AIGSs, suggesting
that compulsory participation may in fact be preferable. Such an approach could addition-
ally be justified by AIGSs intended rational as a tool to regulate the AI industry’s incentive
structure, while at the same time potentially pursuing other policy objectives.
Funding and pricing : Guarantee schemes involve a redistribution of losses, calling certain
stakeholders to foot the bill to alleviate pressure on others. Striking a level of redistribution
that stakeholders perceive as fair is therefore key to ensure guarantee funds’ acceptance
and efficiency. Funding relates to the timing and rate of contributions, as well as the base
of funding, while pricing determines contributors’ relative share. With respect to FGSs,
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the Davis report notes that funding and pricing considerations should strive to accommo-
date four general goals: (1) cost efficiency (minimize administrative costs), (2) competitive
neutrality (equitable treatment of contributors with similar characteristics), (3) stability
(predictable and broadest possible funding base), and (4) allocative efficiency (eliminate
moral hazard incentives).
In terms of the timing of funding, fund administrators have the choice between pre-
funding (where contributions are paid into and managed by the fund), post-funding (whereby
contributors incur contingent liabilities and are only required to pay into the fund after the
guarantee triggering event), or a combination of both. Pre-funding usually implies greater
stability and credibility that funds are readily available in the event of a crisis. It is also
conducive to a higher acceptance of risk-sensitive pricing, typically perceived as fair, and
requires less financial back-up by the public purse. On the down side, pre-funding may
lead to higher than warranted contributions due to the uncertainty of triggering events’
occurrence. It may also create moral hazard incentives, raise issues around controlling the
size of the contribution pool, and be less cost efficient than post-funding. Post funding, on
the other hand has a pro-cyclical impact, in that it imposes a burden on contributors after
a guarantee event, compounding their financial difficulties.
Regarding the funding base, the main questions revolve around the relative ratio of
public and private funding, whether to establish several domain-specific schemes or one
cross-sectoral fund, and the basis for calculating contributions. The pros of domain-specific
schemes include cost efficiency, competitive neutrality, sensitivity to domain specific char-
acteristics, and avoidance of cross-subsidies. However, they are less financially stable, have
a restricted ability to realize diversification benefits, and may face transition problems due
to structural changes in the organization of contributing entities.
Finally, pricing choices are usually about striking an acceptable balance between sim-
plicity and efficiency. The latter is promoted by differential, risk-sensitive contributions,
which are typically the better choice when it comes to combating moral hazard and ensur-
ing equitable treatment of contributors, but are also complex to implement. The alternative
is to require uniform, flat-rate contributions, which excel in simplicity, transparency, and
involve low implementation costs.
Applying these insights to AIGSs, the kinds of systemic crises with the potential to
deplete FGSs and necessitate state involvement are admittedly a highly remote possibility
in the AI context. However, since it is impossible to predict the exact trajectory of AI inno-
vation, it is hard to anticipate if and how this might change in the future. This uncertainty
coupled with better feasibility of risk-sensitive pricing and the likelihood that industry
would perceive pre-funding as the fairer funding option are strong arguments in favor of
pre-funding. Because of the lack of large-scale shocks that may strain schemes’ funding re-
sources, it is unlikely that post-funding, even in an auxiliary form, will be necessary (again,
this may change based on how the current state of affairs develop). As for funding base,
we believe that, unless specific policy considerations dictate otherwise, this should be re-
stricted to private contributions from the AI industry—the group whose incentive structure
it aims to target—without involving public funds or contributions from AI users. Recalling
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our above recommendation for domain-specific AI governance arrangements, funding should
be organized on a sectoral basis. Contributions should be calculated taking due account
of domain-specific criteria based on, e.g., the estimated amount of compensation awards
obtainable in litigation. Reiterating the importance of the perceived fairness of schemes’
redistributive effects, we strongly favor risk-sensitive pricing arrangements. We also call for
considering a number of risk management techniques available in the financial regulatory
domain to gauge contributors’ risk to FGSs as a possible model to overcome hurdles of
complexity.
Compensation process: In terms of the process by which victims and otherwise aggrieved
parties may obtain compensation, Pearl’s simple, non-adversarial approach—requiring clai-
mants to file a claim with an AIGS outlining the grounds for a compensation award and
waiving their right to litigate upon acceptance of the award—coupled with appropriate ap-
peal and dispute resolution mechanisms would presumably be suitable for most AI domains.
6 Conclusion
With an eye on the primary objective pursued by AI innovation—enhancing inclusive eco-
nomic and social welfare across the globe—this paper has exposed weaknesses in the existing
system of legal liability and put forward solutions that would facilitate a smooth transition
into an AI-driven society.
One aim was to expand the existing literature by providing a comparative legal analysis
spanning both civil and criminal legal domains to make the claim that foreseeability is a
central prerequisite for attributing legal liability across all jurisdictions and legal domains.
We then showed that there exist certain AI systems, which do not satisfy the foreseeability
requirement, making it impossible to solve liability issues via conventional legal liability
regimes under certain circumstances, and generating considerable legal uncertainty. We
also raised economic and international relations arguments to highlight the economic and
political costs of treating liability problems as a solely legal matter and of failure to resolve
this problem of uncertainty in a timely manner. To assist current policy efforts to settle
on a widely-accepted AI definition, we engaged in a discussion of the vices and virtues of
such an approach, advocating functional, technology-specific definitions for regulatory and
policy purposes with only an auxiliary role for more generic definitions.
The recommended amendment to the legal liability system would better account for AI’s
social utility. The system of AIGSs—a solution outside of the purview of legal liability—
would constitute a predictable and transparent framework for swift compensation of dam-
ages where litigation is not promising either because the category of harm caused by an
AI system is unforeseeable and hence not imputable under current legal liability rules or
because the process would be overly complex due to other legal intricacies. Prospective de-
fendants would no longer need to fear arbitrary court decisions that stretch the limits of legal
liability in dogmatically inconsistent, unpredictable ways to correct an otherwise uncom-
pensated injustice. Potential victims and aggrieved parties would have peace of mind using
AI, knowing that bringing complex and expensive actions of dubious outcome are no longer
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the only option to obtain compensation should something go wrong. By fair loss-spreading
and clear allocation of risks among potential defendants and plaintiffs or prosecutors in fu-
ture AI liability suits, the proposed system of AIGSs would also support emerging markets
in AI technologies, in particular foster innovation and AI’s social acceptance. Moreover, if
desired, the AIGSs could assume a broader role within the overall regulatory framework
structuring our economies. Of course, the current virtually non-existent AI governance
landscape leaves quite a few blanks in regard to AIGSs’ design, but reassuringly, experience
with FGSs could inform many design and implementation decisions AIGS designers are
likely to face. In sum, drawing on best-practice mechanisms in financial regulation, AIGSs
would provide legal certainty in dealing with AI-related liability issues without violating
existing liability doctrines and induce a legal environment that fosters safe and responsible
AI innovation and adoption in society.
In line with our objective to point out and raise awareness towards a general, conceptual
legal problem and also because the scope of the present paper did not allow for addressing the
relevant case law of multiple jurisdictions, we expressly leave this work for future research.
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